An early warning system (EWS) to flag troubled banks has been worked on since the early 1990s. The S&L crisis in the 1980s as well as the financial crisis of [2007][2008][2009] have been extensively worked on to find important variables that help to predict bank failure and the logit model has been the standard workhorse. This paper adopts another strategy to predict bank failure in the machine learning field in order to build a more efficient EWS. Using a logit model and a random forest, I find that the random forest approach significantly outperforms the logit regression in the training (in-sample) data. The random forest also outperforms the logit in bank failure prediction in the testing (out-of-sample) data as the data used to estimate the model is closer in time to the testing sample. One way to make an EWS more effective would be to flag potentially troubled banks a few years in advance using a logit model at the beginning of a crisis, and then quickly update these predictions with a random forest as the crisis evolves and more data readily available.
Introduction
The last two banking crises (S&L crisis of late 1980s through early 1990s and financial crisis of [2007] [2008] [2009] ) have led to many investigations into the sources of these crises and a better understanding of bank failure. As a result, we have a good grasp on the important lead indicators significantly related to failure and some useful methods to predict failure.
A model that can accurately identify troubled banks before failure is desirable in all times, but paramount during the early stages and in the midst of a crisis. This paper focuses on building a more effective early warning system to predict bank failure during a crisis. The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, I investigate if the efficacy of predicting failures is increased by a random forest machine learning algorithm as compared to a logistic regression.
Second, I examine if the models used to predict out-of-sample failure become more effective as the data used to build those models are updated as a crisis ensues.
Since the early 1990s, the standard model used for such purposes has been the logistic regression (logit) model. Logits are useful in identifying statistically significant variables related to failure because they are parametric estimators and can be useful for predicting failure, but under some fairly strict data assumptions (i.e. distributional assumptions and assumptions of log-linearity). The advent of other machine learning algorithms have brought substantial gains in prediction of outcomes in other fields such as marketing, though the banking literature has yet to adopt these models with any consistency. This paper bridges this gap and introduces an alternative to the logit model, the random forest. This is done by estimation of these two models using 2008-only data and then with the inclusion of 2009 data.
I then compare the model's predictive power over failures over 2010 and 2011 to understand how model type and estimation data can be used to build a better early warning system. I find that the random forest significantly outperforms the logit regression in the training (in-sample) data in which the models are estimated. The random forest also outperforms the logit in bank failure prediction in the testing (out-of-sample) data as the data used to estimate the model is closer in time to the testing sample. One way to make an EWS more effective would be to flag banks for trouble a few years out using a logit model at the beginning of a crisis, and then quickly update these predictions with a random forest as the crisis evolves and more data can be included in the estimation.
An early warning system (EWS) that flags troubled banks before insolvency is both useful and prudent. An effective EWS helps to maximize the efficiency of the limited resources regulatory agencies have to spread over an expansive banking sector. Furthermore, such a system is most imperative as a crisis is beginning to unfold and more banks are at risk of insolvency and regulatory oversight. During the most recent financial crisis that started it was not in the middle of processing banks that did fail. Even a small percentage gain in predictability has the potential to save time, money, and human effort for such regulatory agencies. Therefore, an EWS that produces even small gains over the conventional models is nontrivial.
This paper is one is very few which use machine learning to predict failures, and one of even fewer used to predict bank failure. It also is one of the most recent papers that aligns with the early literature that attempts to not only identify significant causal variables for failure, but also develop an early warning system to aid in predicting upcoming failures. The main contribution of this paper is to test the predicting efficiency across competing prediction models to identify which model, if any, predicts the best. The methods employed in this paper are easy to adopt and can be used along side of traditional methods so give a more granular picture of why banks fail and what should be tracked to predict such failures. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: a review of the literature surrounding predicting bank failure as well as how machine learning as helped predicting is established. Next, I present the empirical methodology employed in this paper and present the data. I then review the results of the methods and I conclude with a brief discussion of the limitations of the paper and give further research suggestions.
Review of the Literature
There has been substantial research into understanding why banks fail. Numerous studies, such as Thomson (1991) , Cole and Gunther (1995) , and Cole and Gunther (1998) , among others, have all identified CAMEL financial variables (capital adequacy, asset quality, management expertise, earning strength, and liquidity position) as important indicators that predict bank failure.
1 Cole and Fenn (1995) and Cole and White (2012) also discover that real-estate lending and portfolio variables are reliable early indicators of failure. Kolari, Caputo, and Wagner (1996) and Kolari, Glennon, Shin, and Caputo (2002) evidence that logit models and trait recognition models perform equally well in predicting bank failures, including large banks. Furthermore, Torna (2010) , in an attempt to examine non-traditional banking activities, identifies that the loan-to-asset ratio is inversely related to failure for troubled commercial banks, but positively related to failure for healthy ones, though traditional CAMEL variables are significantly related to failure for both troubled and healthy banks. Oshinsky and Olin (2005) take this approach one step further by examining variables that predict troubled banks' futures: recovery, acquisition, or continuation as a troubled bank.
While logistic regressions have been the typical workhorse for predicting and identifying significant variables for bank failure, other models and prediction methods have been utilized as well. Lane, Looney, and Wansley (1986) and Whalen (1991) estimate probability of bank failure using Cox proportional hazards models. Wheelock and Wilson (2000) use a competing hazard model to estimate either failure or acquisition. They find that poor management quality increases the likelihood of failure but reduces the likelihood of acquisition while more insolvent banks are more likely to be acquired.
There is also evidence that bank failures are contagious. Diamond and Rajan (2005) Bologna (2011) , who finds that access to liquidity via short-term borrowing does significantly reduce the probability of borrower default, and by extension, leads to less banking insolvency. Collender and Shaffer (2002) assert that geographic deregulation has not adversely impacted nonmetropolitan income or employment; this suggests that national banks entering domestic markets via new branches or mergers may increase bank competition and not crowd out local banks. Tussing (1967) argues that new banks wishing to enter a market may, in-turn, cause another bank to fail. When a market has an optimal number of banks, a new bank that wishes to enter must be more efficient than the least efficient pre-existing bank. If the entering bank is wrong, it will fail. However, if it is more efficient, then the market will be overbanked and the least efficient bank exits. Tussing (1967) continues by asserting that regulation of entry and exits may cause the competitive outcome to differ by allowing markets to be overbanked or underbanked. Furthermore, Meyer and Yeager (2001) 3 Empirical Methodology and Data
Model Discussion and Prediction Analysis
Two models are estimated to predict bank failure using banking variables 6 months prior to failure: a logit model and a random forest. The first model estimated is a logistic regression (logit). This model will serve as a baseline model since it is the standard method used in this literature. The logit model estimates the log-odds ratio (probability of failure, P (y = 1|x), to probability of surviving, P (y = 0|x)).
A random forest is based on the classification tree, another type of machine learning. For classification trees, data is split into a training (in-sample) set and a testing (out-of-sample) set. The training data is used to grow (i.e. estimate) the tree and the validity of the model is used on the testing data. A tree is grown by taking all values of each independent variable and determining which value of one variable explains the most entropy in the dependent variable. If the value of the variable is less than this value, the node branches to one side, greater than this value produces a branch on the other side. Then each branch produces another node using the same method as the original node until enough entropy has been explained. The classification tree looks like a decision tree used in game theory, where a series of yes/no questions about the bank variables leads down a series of branches until failure or survivor is predicted. There are two common approaches to building trees. The first approach is a basic recursive partitioning approach where nodes are generated until more nodes cannot explain a set amount of entropy. This approach usually over-produces the number of nodes and are typically pruned back (e.g. nodes at the bottom of the tree are eliminated) to make the tree more elegant and parsimonious. The second method uses a more statistical process to generate a node, and therefore, needs no pruning; it is outlined in Hothorn, Hornik, and Zeileis (2006b) is shown superior in prediction cases. This second method is implemented using the party package in R. More details about the implementation of this package can be found using Hothorn, Hornik, and Zeileis (2006a) .
A random forest grows n classification trees by randomly subsampling the training data (with replacement) and building a tree from each subsample. A random forest is less prone to the training data selection method since outliers will eventually be subsampled out of some trees. A random forest can, therefore, produce n predictions for each observation where each tree essentially gets a vote in the prediction. Like the logit regression, a random forest can provide the probability of failure by calculating proportion of trees in the forest that predict failure.
Both the logit and random forest yield predictions about bank failure,ŷ. The models validity and efficiency in estimation is based on how well predicted outcomes match actual outcomes, y. Since predicted and actual outcomes are binary variables, the efficiency of each model can be visualized in a 2x2 matrix with predicted outcomes along the top and actual outcomes along the side. There are four cases overall: 1.) a true negative ( error. This matrix is outlined in Table 1 .
The machine learning field has developed several statistics to test the validity of the models used that are based on the type-I and type-II errors (FP and FN listed above). One false negative is more costly in predicting bank failure. As a result, the F2 is also a viable (and possibly better) measure to use. F scores are calculated as:
A second statistic that examines prediction fit is a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. A ROC curve plots false positive (FP) rates (1-specificity/ recall) versus true positive (TP) rates (sensitivity) at various thresholds to predict failure. If the threshold (probability) needed to predict failure is low, the higher the true positive rates are as actual failures that were predicted are more likely. However, there may be a lot of false positives as well since it is also likely to predict failure for banks that survived. As this threshold increases, the true positive rate diminishes as to the false positive rate, until the threshold is so high, that no is at predicting outcomes beyond a random guess. AUCs less than 0.5 indicates the model is worse than a random guess. Because ROC curves are plotted at all thresholds needed to predict failure, AUCs are useful at analyzing models general predictive power. However, one model may outperform other models at specific thresholds while still having lower AUCs.
Youden's J Statistic is the vertical difference between the true positive rate of a model and a random model's true positive rate at a specific threshold, or more specifically, a model's gain in the true positive rate over the random guess at a given threshold. More specifically:
Model Estimation
To answer the two questions this paper covers, I conduct the following:
1. Take data spanning 2008-2011 and divide it up into training (in-sample) data and testing (out-of-sample) data and use data 6 quarters prior to predict failure (e.g. variables from
2006:3 will be used to predict failures in 2008:1, data from 2009:1 will be used to predict failure in 2010:3, etc.).
2. Estimate (build) a logit model and random forest built of 50 trees using the training data and use it to find probabilities of failure for both the training and testing data. 3. Calibrate the models using the probability of failure that optimizes the accuracy of failure prediction in the training data. This calibration finds a threshold to predict failure, thresh that minimizes error rates (maximizes F1 score, F2 score, and Youden's J) such that when the probability of failure, pr, is larger than thresh, then a failure is predicted (ŷ = 1). In a logistic regression, thresh is typically 0.5, but since the data contain such a large number of survivors compared to failures (a vast overdispersion of zeros), a 0.5 threshold to predict failure may be too large where the models may better reduce error rates if thresh is lower. thresh is set such that it reduces the error rates for the models in the training data, or it yields the most accurate predictions.
4. Use the value of thresh found above and use each model to predict failures in the testing data to calculate the out-of-sample prediction efficiency for each model. 
Data Used in Analysis
Bank failures are measured in two ways. The first measure is an FDIC fail as taken from the FDIC failed bank list. The second type of fail is akin to bank insolvency as used in Wheelock and Wilson (2000) where a bank is considered a failure if the ratio of total equity less goodwill to total assets is less than 2%. Data on equity, goodwill, and total assets all from the FFIEC Reports of Condition and Income (the Call Reports).
The sample of banks is taken from 2008:1-2011:4, in which the highest number of banks failed during the financial crisis and Great Recession thereafter. The numbers for each failure-type in each quarter are presented in Figure 2 and presented more numerically in Table 2 . The final dataset is, therefore, a panel of banks in total with these banks surviving or failing each quarter. Due to the nature of insolvency as calculated by Wheelock and Wilson (2000) , it is possible for a bank to be insolvent (failed) several quarters in the sample and switching between failed and survived several times. FDIC fails are terminal in the sample because the bank ceases to exist thereafter and can only fail once.
CAMEL variables include the ratio of equity to total assets as a measure of capital adequacy. Real estate lending, commercial and industrial lending, net chargeoffs, and nonperforming loans (loans 30-89 days past due but still accruing interest, loans 90 or more days past due but still accruing interest, and all nonaccrual loans) all as a ratio to total assets measure asset quality. Noninterest expense to the sum of net interest income and noninterest income measure managerial quality. Return on assets measures earnings, and the ratio to federal funds purchased less federal funds sold to total assets measures liquidity.
Other bank financial variables include the log of total assets and brokered deposits to total assets. All of these variables are measured from the Call Reports. Table 3 describes and summarizes all of these variables for the training (in-sample) data while Table 4 does so for the testing (out-of-sample) data..
Results
The F1 by the color blue, and the random forest scores are in black. Finally, the left axis is scaled for the training-data random forest score, and the right axis is scaled for all else.
Examination of the six graphs shows common characteristics amongst the scores. First, the random forest scores for the training sample dominate all other samples and methods.
The average score for the random forest training sample is between 2 to 5 times higher among all different training samples; a very large improvement. The second common theme across the six graphs also show that the random forest (both training and testing samples) and the testing sample logit model show large gains in the scores for very low thresholds, but these scores also diminish very rapidly as the threshold increases slightly. Third, and last, the the maximum scores for this sample and model are higher than the scores for the logit model on the training data; the scores for the logit are higher for out-of-sample prediction than the scores for which the model is estimated. Additionally, the scores from the logit testing sample have robust staying power across various thresholds; the scores peak at higher thresholds than any other sample and model, and remain quite high relative to the maximum as the threshold to predict failure increases. (2000) failures, which again is defined as equity less goodwill is less than 2% of assets. Because it is more of an insolvency variable than a failure variable, banks may be considered ''failed'' several quarters, and may ultimately be proceeded by an FDIC failure.
Somewhat surprisingly, the F1 and F2 scores for WW (2000) failures are comparable to the scores generated from the FDIC failures. In fact, the scores look almost identical and all the analysis discussed for Figures 3 to 8 for the FDIC failures also hold true for WW (2000) failures.
The analysis of F1 and F2 scores are useful in understanding the penalty for type-I and type-II errors between the models, but the predicting power of the models overall may be better observed through the the receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curve. These ROC F scores and ROC curves give insight as to how the models perform in predicting bank failure across various thresholds, but any EWS to be used would need a threshold (or several)
to be defined in advance to flag banks that may potentially fail in the future. One way to chose these thresholds would be to use the threshold which maximizes F-scores or Youden's J Statistic in the training sample, and see how the models compare for those scores with that predefined threshold in the testing sample. The results of this analysis are contained in Table 5 . Viewing the models that were estimated using 2008-only training data, the logit Secondly, all data from the crisis was used to estimate the models, and as a result, there was a vast overdispersion of survivals (zeros) in the data which lead to very low probability 
